A First-Lens Analysis
Pericles: Indispensable to Athens

Sparta, having determined in its war council to resist any further Athenian action, sent emissaries to Athens with a direct message: "Sparta wants peace. Peace is still possible if you will give the Hellenes their freedom" (Thucydides, I.139; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Penguin Classics, 1985, p. 118). Thucydides tells us that many Athenians spoke, but it was Pericles who rose and carried the day. The Athenian leader told the Assembly,

If you give in, you will immediately be confronted with some greater demand, since they will think that you gave way on this point through fear. But if you take a firm stand you will make it clear to them that they have to treat you properly as equals. . . . We must realize too, that, both for cities and for individuals, it is from the greatest dangers that the greatest glory is to be won. When our fathers stood against the Persians they had no such resources as we have now . . . we must live up to the standard they set: we must resist our enemies in any and every way, and try to leave to those who come after us an Athens that is as great as ever (Thucydides, I.140 and I.144; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Penguin Classics, 1985, p.119 and p. 123).

What might, in the end, have driven Pericles to take such a hard line and argue for rejection of compromise? If he had labored so hard to avoid conflict with Sparta, why would he have urged resistance and war? His reference to Athens's previous victory over Persia was not simply to recall the last major war, but clearly sprung from his personal connection to that conflict. His father had made his name as a leading general during the Persian campaign and through his actions he left to Pericles's generation the seeds of an empire. Although Pericles had overseen the consolidation of that empire, the Spartan ultimatum was Pericles's opportunity to parallel his father's legacy.

This First-Lens focus on personal background suggests another reason why, when faced with a direct challenge from Sparta, Pericles was inclined to abandon his previous position: Pericles saw himself as critical to Athenian democracy and thus to Athenian security.

In case of war against a major power, Pericles had long settled on a military strategy that emphasized Athens's two greatest strengths: its navy and its financial wealth, which supported each other. Athenian wealth depended on tribute paid by allies that was paid because Athens had a strong navy, which in turn could only be maintained through the wealth generated through a system of tribute. The loss of two major land battles—at Tanagra in 457 and at Coronea in 447—had convinced Pericles that contesting Spartan dominance on land was risky and potentially impossible. Athens would not be a land empire. Instead, Pericles saw Athens's defense in the long walls Athens had built from the Acropolis to the sea, which essentially made the city-state a land-island, separate from the rest of the Attica region. The notion of a land-island was the essence of Pericles's conception of Athenian security. If war were to come with Sparta, Pericles wanted Athens to remain behind its walls and capitalize on its naval strength rather than fight Sparta's land armies. Athens, according to Pericles's plan, should rely on its wealth and sea trade to survive and simply blockade and attack the ports that supported the Spartan cause. Pericles reasoned that if Sparta saw no prospect of a quick victory, it might be deterred from beginning a war with Athens. If war did occur, the denial of a quick victory would turn the war into a battle of attrition, which Athens could win. This strategy underpinned Pericles's speech favoring war and is also echoed in his famous Funeral Oration, given after the war began (Thucydides, I.140–44, and II.34–46; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Penguin Classics, 1985, pp. 118–22 and pp. 143–51).

Pericles understood that it would be very difficult to implement this strategy in actual war, when an increasingly heady Athenian Assembly would likely want to take the battle directly to the enemy. If the initial phase of the conflict favored Athens, the Assembly might be tempted into adventures to increase the size of the empire (like it did when it invaded Egypt after earlier defeating Persia). Alternatively, if a siege of Athens began to wear on the people, Athenians might lose patience and go over the walls to break the Spartan's encirclement. Both reactions would have undermined Pericles's basic strategy and proven disastrous from his standpoint.

Given his experience and prestige, Pericles was the only Athenian who could have avoided both extremes. Once Sparta voted for war, Pericles saw it in Athens's strategic interest that war come quickly, in part, so that Sparta could not improve its navy and treasury in preparation for a long war but, more importantly, so that he could direct the Athenian campaign himself. The Athenian general knew he was critical to holding the Assembly together on a dual strategy of defense and limited naval attacks, and he also worried about his age. If the actual outbreak of war was delayed through diplomatic negotiations and arbitration, which likely would have failed, Pericles might have died before victory was achieved. His strategy rested on outlasting the Spartans, rather than on quick victory. Wars of attrition are contests of will and resources, and they require great popular support and high morale. As a respected military leader and public servant, Pericles had sufficient influence over the diverse factions within the Assembly to hold a majority together on his particular course. A First-Lens focus reveals a leader who had come to see himself as indispensable. The fact that after he died in the early stages of the war, Athens did abandon his strategy—to eventual disastrous consequence—might suggest that he was right.