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A Third-Lens Variable: Anarchy

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At the domestic level, politics is structured around various forms of centralized governments. A specific authority over a particular territory provides support—legal standards, education, policing, medical coverage, transportation, communication—to the society in general. In turn, members of the society recognize the authority of the central government and are obliged to abide by that authority. Domestic society is organized hierarchically, with different functional roles assigned different responsibilities and requiring different commitments from individual members of society.

When examining the international system through the Third Lens, the first aspect to be observed is the absence of a universal authoritative government to which international actors must report. Internationally, there is no such central authority above the territorial state to which states or individuals grant the same commitment. From a structural perspective, international politics is anarchic. For political scientists, anarchy does not mean chaos and violence, but rather the lack of centralized political authority.

Many students' first reaction to the assertion that the world political system is anarchic is to ask about the United Nations, an organization that was created ostensibly to act as an international authority. From a Third-Lens perspective, however, the United Nations is simply a collection of states in which power rests with its members rather than with some central body. While the United Nations reflects the institutionalization of international relations, it does not change the structure of world politics from anarchy to hierarchy, although its presence may shape how its member states interact. One of the main reasons why the United Nations is best viewed as a collection of individual states, rather than as a centralized authority, is the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the Peoples' Republic of China), can each veto U.N. action. No significant action can be taken by the United Nations if any of these countries does not approve. Over the past fifty-six years, members of the Security Council have used the veto in hundreds of instances.

From an analytical standpoint, it is important to recognize that the absence of an element can structure behavior as much as can the presence of an element. Just as the hierarchy of government affects members of domestic society, so too does anarchy shape international behavior. Basically, anarchy requires states to rely on themselves. As political scientist John Mearsheimer is fond of saying, there is no international 911 service countries can call when they need effective and immediate help; ultimately, they are on their own.

Recognizing the necessity of self-reliance in international politics explains, in large measure, why countries focus so much on national security. Governments, corporations, and individuals cannot pursue their interests—be they to improve education, healthcare, or the economy—if a country's very existence is not secured. When under attack, self-preservation becomes the number one priority, and states are driven by a structural imperative to increase their own ability to defend themselves. The creation of military forces to dissuade potential opponents from attacking or, if necessary, to defend against actual encroachments is a universal reaction to the self-reliant nature of the international system.

The standard objective of most states, therefore, is the development of a strong national defense. How does a country know when it has sufficient power to secure itself and its interests? The answer seems to be never. During the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign, both Republican and Democratic candidates argued for increases in military spending, even though in 1999 the United States was spending more on its own military than the next twelve top defense spenders combined, and eight of these countries are considered allies of the United States. Of those states not aligned with Washington, U.S. spending was more than double the expenditures of Russia, China, and the seven states that the United States considers rogues—Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Considering this substantial advantage in spending already, it seems surprising that U.S. leaders thought an increase was necessary.

Measuring national power, however, is not as simple as counting dollars devoted to military expenditures. You must consider not just the number of weapons a country possesses, but also their quality and the soldiers' skill in using them. Additionally, a country's economic strength and natural resource base, combined with such abstract factors as national morale, must be included in the aggregate (or what some call the absolute) measure of power assigned to a state.

But being powerful in absolute terms does not guarantee security. After the First World War, France had a very large and sophisticated military and built huge defensive works along its border with Germany. In absolute terms, France was a powerful state. Yet in a few short weeks in the spring of 1940, the German military rolled into France and occupied the country. Despite France's strength, French power proved inadequate to fend off Germany. With this example in mind, the United States' decision to increase defense spending in the twenty first century reflects the concern that the United States must be ready for new threats while it continues to contain current threats.

The anarchical structure of international politics requires states to assess their power relative to present and future dangers. A country cannot simply be satisfied with its current position, but must plan for the future. Such planning, by its nature, involves uncertainty and thus a good bit of educated guesswork. Imagine that you are a leader of a country and your military advisers provide the following estimate: There is a 60 percent probability that our known enemy will not increase its power relative to us over the next ten years and therefore we can cut some defense spending and move it toward improving the educational system of the country. There is a 30 percent probability that our enemy will make marginal technical advances that would increase their relative power unless we maintain our current spending and a 10 percent chance that the enemy will find a revolutionary technology that will enable them to leap-frog over us unless we increase defense spending for research and development in an attempt to beat them to the punch. Although increasing funding of education might be attractive, a 40 percent chance that things could go badly in the future is something not easily dismissed. Now complicate this problem by considering how many countries a leader must be concerned about. In 1944, the Soviet Union and the United States were allies in a war against Germany. In 1955, the United States and Germany were allies in an intense competition against the Soviet Union. As the British Lord Palmerston remarked in a famous anecdote on the flux of international alliances, "There are no permanent friends, just permanent interests." Given uncertainty, leaders are likely to default to worst-case scenarios as they plan for the future, so politicians continue to put a high priority on increasing defense budgets.

The problem in a self-help system is that one state's actions affect those of other states. If Country A improves its military to gain security, its increased capabilities make other countries feel less secure. It is rational for Country B, feeling less secure, to try to increase its power. This action, of course, changes Country B's relative power relationship with Country A. Country A must then reconsider its position. This focus on relative power creates a security dilemma. States must secure themselves, but in doing so, they create incentives for other states to increase their own power, which in turn makes every state feel less secure.

Note that states' motivations are primarily defensive. States are simply trying to protect themselves. We don't need to assume aggression in order to have a security dilemma. Also, each state's individual decision is rational, despite the fact that taken collectively no state achieves what it wants—a relative power imbalance in its favor.

Thus, looking through the Third Lens at anarchy reveals the self-help nature of the system, which explains states' concern with national security. Security requires power, but the pursuit of power affects everyone else in the system, thereby creating a dilemma over security.

From an understanding of anarchy, we can analyze two measures—the security dilemma's intensity and the overall distribution of power across the international or regional system. While anarchy creates a security dilemma, states' reactions to the dilemma may depend on the type of weapons involved and the capacity of relevant states to use them. Political scientists have argued that when defensive capabilities dominate a strategic environment, the security dilemma may be less intense. States will not feel as much pressure to respond to increases in power. A Third-Lens analysis of the intensity of the security dilemma, however, requires some measurement of defensive capability, which is not always easy to determine: One country's defensive system may be viewed as offensive by another. In the 1980s, for example, the Reagan administration proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative, an effort to build a national shield against missile attack—purely a defensive measure, proponents claimed. The proposal was quickly dubbed "Star Wars," when the Soviet Union objected to its offensive potential. The Soviet Union argued that if the United States was protected from retaliation, then Washington might be inclined to attack Moscow during a future crisis. Soviet leaders suggested that the defensive shield would actually enhance U.S. offensive capabilities.

Anarchy also points to another measure—the overall distribution of power throughout the international political system. Here, Third-Lens analysts ask whether power is concentrated in the hands of one superpower, two great powers, or multiple great powers. Political scientists label these distributions of power based on the number of relevant concentrations of great power, or poles—unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. Looking at this variable, we might be able to explain the differences between international politics in 1999, 1979, and 1749. Knowing that one state dominated the first period, two states controlled the second period, and multiple great powers vied with each other in shifting alliances during the third period can critically affect the understanding of such different international activities as trade and war.

During the Cold War, most states were concerned with the United States and the Soviet Union's international interactions. Attention was focused on these two states because the system was bipolar, making these two states the most important actors in the period 1945–1991. In 2001, however, the main issues of world politics largely revolve around the United States, reflecting a distribution of power concentrated in one pole. From a Third-Lens perspective, the distribution of power not only shapes actual state relations (that is, state policies are a reaction to the distribution of power), but it also shapes how we think about those relations.

When looking at anarchy through the Third Lens, consider both the overall distribution of power in the system (unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar) [see figure 4.1] and the intensity of the security dilemma. Other variables besides anarchy, however, affect Third-Lens thinking, including the balance of power and international law and institutions.

Third-Lens Variables

THE BALANCING OF POWER
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS

 

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Credits Copyright 2001 W. W. Norton & Company Copyright 2001 W. W. Norton & Company