At the domestic level, politics is
structured around various forms of centralized
governments. A specific authority over a particular
territory provides supportlegal standards,
education, policing, medical coverage, transportation,
communicationto the society in general.
In turn, members of the society recognize the
authority of the central government and are obliged
to abide by that authority. Domestic society is
organized hierarchically, with different functional
roles assigned different responsibilities and
requiring different commitments from individual
members of society.
When examining the international
system through the Third Lens, the first aspect
to be observed is the absence of a universal authoritative
government to which international actors must
report. Internationally, there is no such central
authority above the territorial state to which
states or individuals grant the same commitment.
From a structural perspective, international politics
is anarchic. For political scientists, anarchy
does not mean chaos and violence, but rather the
lack of centralized political authority.
Many students' first reaction to
the assertion that the world political system
is anarchic is to ask about the United
Nations, an organization that was created
ostensibly to act as an international authority.
From a Third-Lens perspective, however, the United
Nations is simply a collection of states in which
power rests with its members rather than with
some central body. While the United Nations reflects
the institutionalization of international relations,
it does not change the structure of world politics
from anarchy to hierarchy, although its presence
may shape how its member states interact. One
of the main reasons why the United Nations is
best viewed as a collection of individual states,
rather than as a centralized authority, is the
fact that the five permanent members of the Security
Council (United States, United Kingdom, France,
Russia, and the Peoples' Republic of China), can
each veto U.N. action. No significant action can
be taken by the United Nations if any of these
countries does not approve. Over the past fifty-six
years, members of the Security Council have used
the veto
in hundreds of instances.
From an analytical standpoint, it
is important to recognize that the absence of
an element can structure behavior as much as can
the presence of an element. Just as the hierarchy
of government affects members of domestic society,
so too does anarchy shape international behavior.
Basically, anarchy requires states to rely on
themselves. As political
scientist John Mearsheimer is fond of saying,
there is no international 911 service countries
can call when they need effective and immediate
help; ultimately, they are on their own.
Recognizing the necessity of self-reliance
in international politics explains, in large measure,
why countries focus so much on national security.
Governments, corporations, and individuals cannot
pursue their interestsbe they to improve
education, healthcare, or the economyif
a country's very existence is not secured. When
under attack, self-preservation becomes the number
one priority, and states are driven by a structural
imperative to increase their own ability to defend
themselves. The creation of military forces to
dissuade potential opponents from attacking or,
if necessary, to defend against actual encroachments
is a universal reaction to the self-reliant nature
of the international system.
The standard objective of most states,
therefore, is the development of a strong national
defense. How does a country know when it has sufficient
power to secure itself and its interests? The
answer seems to be never. During the 2000 U.S.
presidential campaign, both Republican and Democratic
candidates argued for increases in military spending,
even though in 1999 the United States was spending
more on its own military than the next twelve
top defense spenders combined, and eight of
these countries are considered allies of the United
States. Of those states not aligned with Washington,
U.S. spending was more than double the expenditures
of Russia, China, and the seven states that the
United States considers roguesCuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Considering
this substantial advantage in spending already,
it seems surprising that U.S. leaders thought
an increase was necessary.
Measuring national power, however,
is not as simple as counting dollars devoted to
military expenditures. You must consider not just
the number of weapons a country possesses, but
also their quality and the soldiers' skill in
using them. Additionally, a country's economic
strength and natural resource base, combined with
such abstract factors as national morale, must
be included in the aggregate (or what some call
the absolute) measure of power assigned to a state.
But being powerful in absolute terms
does not guarantee security. After the First World
War, France had a very large and sophisticated
military and built huge defensive works along
its border with Germany. In absolute terms, France
was a powerful state. Yet in a few short weeks
in the spring of 1940, the German military rolled
into France and occupied the country. Despite
France's strength, French power proved inadequate
to fend off Germany. With this example in mind,
the United States' decision to increase defense
spending in the twenty first century reflects
the concern that the United States must be ready
for new threats while it continues to contain
current threats.
The anarchical structure of international
politics requires states to assess their power
relative to present and future dangers. A country
cannot simply be satisfied with its current position,
but must plan for the future. Such planning, by
its nature, involves uncertainty and thus a good
bit of educated guesswork. Imagine that you are
a leader of a country and your military advisers
provide the following estimate: There is a 60
percent probability that our known enemy will
not increase its power relative to us over the
next ten years and therefore we can cut some defense
spending and move it toward improving the educational
system of the country. There is a 30 percent probability
that our enemy will make marginal technical advances
that would increase their relative power unless
we maintain our current spending and a 10 percent
chance that the enemy will find a revolutionary
technology that will enable them to leap-frog
over us unless we increase defense spending for
research and development in an attempt to beat
them to the punch. Although increasing funding
of education might be attractive, a 40 percent
chance that things could go badly in the future
is something not easily dismissed. Now complicate
this problem by considering how many countries
a leader must be concerned about. In 1944, the
Soviet Union and the United States were allies
in a war against Germany. In 1955, the United
States and Germany were allies in an intense competition
against the Soviet Union. As the British Lord
Palmerston remarked in a famous anecdote on the
flux of international alliances, "There are
no permanent friends, just permanent interests."
Given uncertainty, leaders are likely to default
to worst-case scenarios as they plan for the future,
so politicians continue to put a high priority
on increasing defense budgets.
The problem in a self-help system
is that one state's actions affect those of other
states. If Country A improves its military to
gain security, its increased capabilities make
other countries feel less secure. It is rational
for Country B, feeling less secure, to try to
increase its power. This action, of course, changes
Country B's relative power relationship with Country
A. Country A must then reconsider its position.
This focus on relative power creates a security
dilemma. States must secure themselves, but
in doing so, they create incentives for other
states to increase their own power, which in turn
makes every state feel less secure.
Note that states' motivations are
primarily defensive. States are simply trying
to protect themselves. We don't need to assume
aggression in order to have a security dilemma.
Also, each state's individual decision is rational,
despite the fact that taken collectively no state
achieves what it wantsa relative power imbalance
in its favor.
Thus, looking through the Third Lens
at anarchy reveals the self-help nature of the
system, which explains states' concern with national
security. Security requires power, but the pursuit
of power affects everyone else in the system,
thereby creating a dilemma over security.
From an understanding of anarchy,
we can analyze two measuresthe security
dilemma's intensity and the overall distribution
of power across the international or regional
system. While anarchy creates a security dilemma,
states' reactions to the dilemma may depend on
the type of weapons involved and the capacity
of relevant states to use them. Political scientists
have argued that when defensive capabilities dominate
a strategic environment, the security dilemma
may be less intense. States will not feel as much
pressure to respond to increases in power. A Third-Lens
analysis of the intensity of the security dilemma,
however, requires some measurement of defensive
capability, which is not always easy to determine:
One country's defensive system may be viewed as
offensive by another. In the 1980s, for example,
the Reagan administration proposed the Strategic
Defense Initiative, an effort to build a national
shield against missile attackpurely a defensive
measure, proponents claimed. The proposal was
quickly dubbed "Star Wars," when the
Soviet Union objected to its offensive potential.
The Soviet Union argued that if the United States
was protected from retaliation, then Washington
might be inclined to attack Moscow during a future
crisis. Soviet leaders suggested that the defensive
shield would actually enhance U.S. offensive capabilities.
Anarchy also points to another measurethe
overall distribution of power throughout the international
political system. Here, Third-Lens analysts ask
whether power is concentrated in the hands of
one superpower, two great powers, or multiple
great powers. Political scientists label these
distributions of power based on the number of
relevant concentrations of great power, or polesunipolar,
bipolar, and multipolar. Looking at this variable,
we might be able to explain the differences between
international politics in 1999, 1979, and 1749.
Knowing that one state dominated the first period,
two states controlled the second period, and multiple
great powers vied with each other in shifting
alliances during the third period can critically
affect the understanding of such different international
activities as trade and war.
During the Cold
War, most states were concerned with the United
States and the Soviet Union's international interactions.
Attention was focused on these two states because
the system was bipolar, making these two states
the most important actors in the period 19451991.
In 2001, however, the main issues of world politics
largely revolve around the United States, reflecting
a distribution of power concentrated in one pole.
From a Third-Lens perspective, the distribution
of power not only shapes actual state relations
(that is, state policies are a reaction to the
distribution of power), but it also shapes how
we think about those relations.
When looking at anarchy through the
Third Lens, consider both the overall distribution
of power in the system (unipolar, bipolar, or
multipolar) [see figure
4.1] and the intensity of the security dilemma.
Other variables besides anarchy, however, affect
Third-Lens thinking, including the balance of
power and international law and institutions.
Third-Lens Variables
THE
BALANCING OF POWER
INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
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