
ESSAY

1. Consider the relationship between the metaphysics of race and the metaphysics of gender. Should we expect race and gender to have the same metaphysical status (as, e.g., real scientific kinds, social constructions, subjective self-categorizations, or illusions)?

ANS: Answers will vary. A basic answer might discuss Haslanger's unified treatment of both concept types. A good answer might note that eliminativism and biological realism seem more plausible/defensible for race than for gender, whereas subjective (or "internalist") views are generally seen as more plausible for gender than for race. An especially excellent answer might then explore possible reasons for these disparities.

DIF: Difficult
REF: 543-593
MSC: Analyzing

2. Spencer argues that the OMB races are folk races, and that these folk races are real biological entities. Explain Spencer's argument in your own words. Consider Sadia, a Pakistani-American. Why might Sadia be thought to pose a challenge to Spencer's argument?

ANS: Answers will vary. Answers should explicitly discuss why Spencer thinks that the OMB races are folk races. Discussion of Sadia should note that those of Pakistani descent are classed by the OMB as white, though most people would probably not think of Pakistani-Americans as being of the same racial group as Americans of European descent. This casts doubt on Spencer's premise that the OMB races are folk races. Responses on Spencer's behalf might cite his defense of the "folkiness" of OMB races on grounds that they are widely used in official paperwork. Answers may note that it is unclear whether this is sufficient to make something a folk concept (rather than, say, a bureaucratic one).

DIF: Medium
REF: 571-581
TOP: "Are Folk Races Like Dingoes, Dimes, or Dodos?", Quayshawn Spencer | Chapter 12: What Is Race? What Is Gender?
MSC: Evaluating

3. What does Appiah mean when he writes that "there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask 'race' to do for us"? Propose a possible objection to Appiah's reasoning and assess whether the objection is successful, or whether Appiah could plausibly respond to it.

ANS: Answers will vary. Responses might begin by explaining how Appiah believes that our ordinary notion of "race" aims to reveal a deep explanatory divide between different classes of humans, whereas we now know that there is no such deep or explanatory genetic division.
between races. Appiah takes this to suggest that "race" is not a useful concept, and doesn't pick out a real property or natural kind. Possible objections might explore whether our contemporary "race" concept necessarily assumes any such deep divide. For example, it does not seem incoherent to say that "race is only skin deep." Some attempt should be made to charitably imagine how Appiah could respond to their objection, e.g. by distinguishing our verbal platitudes about race from deep-rooted social practices of discrimination and oppression.

DIF: Difficult
REF: 549-560
MSC: Evaluating

4. Haslanger defends her account of gender from the commonality and normativity problems. What are the commonality and normativity problems? How does Haslanger think that her analysis of gender avoids these problems? Haslanger does not explicitly defend her account of race from these problems, writing that in response she would "repeat the strategy just employed." Explain how Haslanger's strategy can be extended to apply to race concepts.

ANS: Answers should touch on the following key points. Answers will explain the commonality challenge (there's nothing that all members of group X have in common) and the normativity challenge (any effort to define group X will result in some members being privileged and others marginalized). Commonality: answers will note Haslanger's defense of oppression-based-on-presumed-anatomy as something that all women have in common ... or at least, something that all those who form "a meaningful political category for critical feminist efforts" have in common. Normativity: answers will note that Haslanger agrees that her analysis may marginalize "non-oppressed females," but that this is okay, as "they are not the ones who matter." Answers should explain Haslanger's analysis of racialized groups as socially positioned based on presumed ancestral links. On commonality, answers will offer a defense of this as something all group members have in common. On normativity, answers will focus on the political importance of our social positioning, arguing that the analysis will capture "the ones who matter" in terms of social oppression.

DIF: Medium
REF: 560-571
MSC: Applying

5. Pick either gender internalism or Haslanger's gender externalism (not both). Explain Barnes's "misgendering" objection to your chosen view, using an example. Suggest a way to defend your chosen view against this objection. Do you think the defense would be successful?
ANS: Answers will vary. Answers should clearly explain the objection, including an example like Barnes's Chi-ah (against externalism) or the severely cognitively disabled woman (against internalism). Externalism might be defended by appeal to Haslanger's "analytical" approach which aims to be politically useful rather than capturing our pre-theoretic concept. Internalism might be defended by questioning the force of the counterexample: it might be argued that to have a gender at all (beyond just a biological sex), one must have some sense of gender identity, or else theorists risk implausibly ascribing genders to non-human animals too.

DIF: Medium
REF: 581-593
MSC: Evaluating

MULTIPLE CHOICE

6. Du Bois's final view is that race is a primarily scientific (biological) concept.
   a. True
   b. False

ANS: False
DIF: Easy
REF: 551, 552, 556
MSC: Understanding

7. Consider a Pacific Islander who is visibly indistinguishable from a person of Sub-Saharan African ancestry. Would Du Bois count this person as black?
   a. Yes, because their skin tone, facial features, and hair are qualitatively indistinguishable from (other) people who are black.
   b. Yes, because they will be subject to the same discrimination based on their physical appearance as those of African descent.
   c. No, because there will be genetic differences between the Pacific Islander and people of African ancestry.
   d. No, because they have a distinct history and distinct traditions from those of African descent.

ANS: D
DIF: Medium
REF: 551, 556
8. Appiah claims that even if (contrary to actual fact) genetic differences between races went along with "large differences in intellectual or moral capacity," still we shouldn't hold that race is what explains these differences. This is because

a. it would be morally corrupting, encouraging unjust racial bias and hatred.
b. race, understood as superficial physical characteristics, would merely correlate with, but not cause, the other differences.
c. genetics are irrelevant as race is socially constructed.
d. how genes are ultimately expressed in an organism still depends upon environmental influences.

ANS: B
DIF: Medium
REF: 554

9. What would Appiah think of the suggestion that races are real and correspond to ancestral continental populations?

a. He would reject it, because ancestral continental populations are unimportant for explaining moral or intellectual differences between people.
b. He would reject it, because ancestral continental populations don't neatly match up to our ordinary racial categories.
c. He would accept it, because ancestral continental populations have a shared culture and history.
d. He would accept it, because one's genomic ancestry is scientifically verifiable.

ANS: A
DIF: Difficult
REF: 554, 555
10. Du Bois once suggested that what black people share is a "common history […] of discrimination and insult." What is Appiah's objection to this idea?

a. It encourages a negative view of what it is to be black.
b. Not all black people suffer "discrimination and insult."
c. It doesn't distinguish black people from other oppressed ethnic groups.
d. Race is illusory.

ANS: C
DIF: Medium
REF: 557
MSC: Remembering

11. Haslanger's main aim is to

a. figure out how we actually use gender and race concepts.
b. develop concepts of race and gender that will be useful tools in fighting injustice.
c. explain why race and gender concepts are outdated and should be abolished.
d. show that there is nothing corresponding to our ordinary race and gender concepts.

ANS: B
DIF: Easy
REF: 562
MSC: Understanding

12. Haslanger holds that "the primary motivation for distinguishing sex from gender" is to account for

a. the distinction between transgender and cisgender people.
b. the fact that males and females systematically differ in their social positions.
c. our subjective gender identities.
d. women who are (unbeknownst even to themselves) biologically intersex.

ANS: B
DIF: Easy
REF: 563
13. Haslanger agrees with Frye that being male is essentially "something a man has going for him."

ANS: False
DIF: Medium
FEEDBACK: Haslanger notes that the social implications of gender vary across contexts because sexism is intertwined in a complicated way with race and class oppression. Haslanger uses the example of being black and male in relation to an interaction with police. In this context, being male is decidedly not something the man has going for him.

REF: 564-565

14. For Haslanger, in an ideal world

a. men and women would be equal.
b. women would be superior to men.
c. there would be no women.
d. all people would be women.

ANS: C
DIF: Medium
REF: 567-568

15. Alex and Byron were both assigned female at birth, but both identify as (trans) men. Neither has had "sex-reassignment" surgery; both take hormone replacement therapy and live as men. Alex is broadly perceived by others who meet him to be a man. But people typically assume that Byron is a woman. On Haslanger's account, what are the genders of Alex and Byron?

a. Alex and Byron are both men: that's how they each self-identify, and an individual's gender self-identification must be respected.
b. Alex and Byron are both women: they both have ovaries, uteruses and XX chromosomes, so biologically and scientifically they are women.
c. Alex is a man, and Byron is a woman: Alex is in a dominant social position due to others' presumption of testes and a penis; Byron is subordinated due to others' presumption of ovaries and a vagina.

d. Alex is a man, and Byron is a woman: that's how they are perceived by others, and gender is an intersubjective social construction.

ANS: C
DIF: Medium
REF: 564

MSC: Applying

16. Spencer's argument takes the which form?

a. The Xs are Y, the Xs are also Zs, so some Zs are Y.
b. The Xs are Y, the Ys are also Zs, so some Zs are X.
c. The Xs are Y, the Xs are the only Zs, so all Zs are Y.
d. The Xs are Y, the Xs are also Z, so all Zs are Y.

ANS: A
DIF: Difficult
REF: 572

TOP: "Are Folk Races Like Dingoes, Dimes, or Dodos?", Quayshawn Spencer | Chapter 12: What Is Race? What Is Gender?
MSC: Analyzing

17. Spencer explains that the human continental populations are

a. Whites, Blacks, and Asians.
b. Africans, Asians, Europeans, and Native Americans.
c. Africans, East Asians, Eurasians, Native Americans, and Oceanians.
d. Africans, East Asians, Europeans, Middle Easterners, Native Americans, and Pacific Islanders.

ANS: C
DIF: Easy
REF: 575.

TOP: "Are Folk Races Like Dingoes, Dimes, or Dodos?", Quayshawn Spencer | Chapter 12: What Is Race? What Is Gender?
MSC: Remembering
18. Glasgow concludes that "black" and "African" are distinct racial categories because he holds that

a. some people are black but not African.
b. "Black" is defined by visible physical features, while "African" is defined by genomic ancestry.
c. some people are African but not black.
d. distinct words have distinct meanings.

ANS: B
DIF: Medium
REF: 577
TOP: "Are Folk Races Like Dingoes, Dimes, or Dodos?", Quayshawn Spencer | Chapter 12: What Is Race? What Is Gender?
MSC: Understanding

19. Descriptivism is a view that seeks to explain the nature of

a. races.
b. concepts.
c. descriptions.
d. names.

ANS: D
DIF: Medium
REF: 577
TOP: "Are Folk Races Like Dingoes, Dimes, or Dodos?" Quayshawn Spencer | Chapter 12: What Is Race? What Is Gender?
MSC: Understanding

20. Spencer addresses Glasgow's objection by appealing to a view in the philosophy of language called ________.

ANS: Referentialism.
DIF: Medium
REF: 577
TOP: "Are Folk Races Like Dingoes, Dimes, or Dodos?", Quayshawn Spencer | Chapter 12: What Is Race? What Is Gender?
MSC: Remembering

21. According to Barnes, biological differences between males and females that affect behavior and personality are more like which of the following?
a. Coloration patterns of peacocks: There is a sharp difference between the coloration of male peacock (iridescent blue) and female peacock (grey/brown), with a clear biological basis.
b. Weight in gorillas: Almost all male gorillas are heavier than almost all female gorillas, though there could be rare individual exceptions.
c. Height in humans: On average, male humans are taller than female humans, but the difference is small and there are many individual females who are taller than individual males.
d. Barnes actually denies that there are any biological differences between male and female humans.

ANS: C
DIF: Easy
REF: 583
MSC: Understanding

22. Views according to which gender is primarily a matter of how others perceive and respond to you are known as ____________.

ANS: Gender externalism [or variants: e.g. gender externalist views]
DIF: Easy
REF: 585
MSC: Remembering

23. Why does Barnes think that cognitively disabled women pose a challenge for gender internalists?

a. Intersectionality means that these women may be treated very differently from non-disabled women.
b. These women may not feel a sense of their relationship to sex-based social norms.
c. Cognitive disabilities may go along with internal physical differences.
d. Cognitive disabilities may cause these women to behave in ways that systematically violate feminine gender norms.

ANS: B
DIF: Medium
REF: 589
24. The idea that one's gender isn't experienced in isolation from other social features (e.g. your race, class) is called __________.

ANS: Intersectionality
DIF: Medium
REF: 586
MSC: Remembering

25. Elsa was assigned female at birth. She has always identified as a woman, and has never given her gender identity any thought. Unbeknownst to her, she has XY sex chromosomes, rather than the XX chromosomes that women typically have, and undescended testes where women typically have ovaries. Barnes suggests that cases like Elsa show that

a. gender cannot be identified with biological sex.
b. gender exists as a spectrum, not a binary.
c. gender internalism is subject to apparent counterexamples.
d. gender externalism is subject to apparent counterexamples.

ANS: A
DIF: Medium
REF: 582
MSC: Applying