Dylan Borchers, “Against the Odds”

Against the Odds: Harry S. Truman and the Election of 1948

“Thomas E. Dewey’s Election as President Is a Foregone Conclusion,” read a headline in the New York Times during the presidential election race between incumbent Democrat Harry S. Truman and his Republican challenger, Thomas E. Dewey. Earlier, Life magazine had put Dewey on its cover with the caption “The Next President of the United States” (qtd. in “1948 Truman-Dewey Election”). In a Newsweek survey of fifty prominent political writers, each one predicted Truman’s defeat, and Time correspondents declared that Dewey would carry 39 of the 48 states (Donaldson 210). Nearly every major media outlet across the United States endorsed Dewey and lambasted Truman. As historian Robert H. Ferrell observes, even Truman’s wife, Bess, thought he would be beaten (270).

The results of an election are not so easily predicted, as the famous photograph on page 2 shows. Not only did Truman win the election, but he won by a significant margin, with 303 electoral votes and 24,179,259 popular votes, compared to Dewey’s 189 electoral votes and 21,991,291 popular votes (Donaldson 204–07). In fact, many historians and political analysts argue that Truman
would have won by an even greater margin had third-party Progressive candidate Henry A. Wallace not split the Democratic vote in New York State and Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond not won four states in the South (McCullough 711). Although Truman's defeat was heavily predicted, those predictions themselves, Dewey's passiveness as a campaigner, and Truman's zeal turned the tide for a Truman victory.

In the months preceding the election, public opinion polls predicted that Dewey would win by a large margin. Pollster Elmo Roper stopped polling in September, believing there was no reason to continue, given a seemingly inevitable Dewey landslide. Although the margin narrowed as the election drew near, the other pollsters...
predicted a Dewey win by at least 5 percent (Donaldson 209). Many historians believe that these predictions aided the president in the long run. First, surveys showing Dewey in the lead may have prompted some of Dewey’s supporters to feel overconfident about their candidate’s chances and therefore to stay home from the polls on Election Day. Second, these same surveys may have energized Democrats to mount late get-out-the-vote efforts (“1948 Truman-Dewey Election”). Other analysts believe that the overwhelming predictions of a Truman loss also kept at home some Democrats who approved of Truman’s policies but saw a Truman loss as inevitable. According to political analyst Samuel Lubell, those Democrats may have saved Dewey from an even greater defeat (Hamby, Man of the People 465). Whatever the impact on the voters, the polling numbers had a decided effect on Dewey.

Historians and political analysts alike cite Dewey’s overly cautious campaign as one of the main reasons Truman was able to achieve victory. Dewey firmly believed in public opinion polls. With all indications pointing to an easy victory, Dewey and his staff believed that all he had to do was bide his time and make no foolish mistakes. Dewey himself said, “When you’re leading, don’t talk” (qtd. in McCullough 672). Each of Dewey’s speeches was well-crafted and well-rehearsed. As the leader in the race, he kept his remarks faultlessly positive, with the result that he failed to deliver a solid message or even mention Truman or any of Truman’s policies. Eventually, Dewey began to be perceived as aloof and stuffy.
observer compared him to the plastic groom on top of a wedding cake (Hamby, “Harry S. Truman”), and others noted his stiff, cold demeanor (McCullough 671–74).

As his campaign continued, observers noted that Dewey seemed uncomfortable in crowds, unable to connect with ordinary people. And he made a number of blunders. One took place at a train stop when the candidate, commenting on the number of children in the crowd, said he was glad they had been let out of school for his arrival. Unfortunately for Dewey, it was a Saturday (“1948: The Great Truman Surprise”). Such gaffes gave voters the feeling that Dewey was out of touch with the public.

Again and again through the autumn of 1948, Dewey’s campaign speeches failed to address the issues, with the candidate declaring that he did not want to “get down in the gutter” (qtd. in McCullough 701). When told by fellow Republicans that he was losing ground, Dewey insisted that his campaign not alter its course. Even Time magazine, though it endorsed and praised him, conceded that his speeches were dull (McCullough 696). According to historian Zachary Karabell, they were “notable only for taking place, not for any specific message” (244). Dewey’s numbers in the polls slipped in the weeks before the election, but he still held a comfortable lead over Truman. It would take Truman’s famous whistle-stop campaign to make the difference.

Few candidates in U.S. history have campaigned for the presidency with more passion and faith than Harry Truman. In the
autumn of 1948, he wrote to his sister, “It will be the greatest campaign any President ever made. Win, lose, or draw, people will know where I stand” (91). For thirty-three days, Truman traveled the nation, giving hundreds of speeches from the back of the Ferdinand Magellan railroad car. In the same letter, he described the pace: “We made about 140 stops and I spoke over 147 times, shook hands with at least 30,000 and am in good condition to start out again tomorrow for Wilmington, Philadelphia, Jersey City, Newark, Albany and Buffalo” (91). McCullough writes of Truman’s campaign:

No President in history had ever gone so far in quest of support from the people, or with less cause for the effort, to judge by informed opinion. . . . As a test of his skills and judgment as a professional politician, not to say his stamina and disposition at age sixty-four, it would be like no other experience in his long, often difficult career, as he himself understood perfectly. More than any other event in his public life, or in his presidency thus far, it would reveal the kind of man he was. (655)

He spoke in large cities and small towns, defending his policies and attacking Republicans. As a former farmer and relatively late bloomer, Truman was able to connect with the public. He developed an energetic style, usually speaking from notes rather than from a prepared speech, and often mingled with the crowds that met his train. These crowds grew larger as the campaign
progressed. In Chicago, over half a million people lined the streets as he passed, and in St. Paul the crowd numbered over 25,000. When Dewey entered St. Paul two days later, he was greeted by only 7,000 supporters (“1948 Truman-Dewey Election”). Reporters brushed off the large crowds as mere curiosity seekers wanting to see a president (McCullough 682). Yet Truman persisted, even if he often seemed to be the only one who thought he could win. By going directly to the American people and connecting with them, Truman built the momentum needed to surpass Dewey and win the election.

The legacy and lessons of Truman’s whistle-stop campaign continue to be studied by political analysts, and politicians today often mimic his campaign methods by scheduling multiple visits to key states, as Truman did. He visited California, Illinois, and Ohio 48 times, compared with 6 visits to those states by Dewey. Political scientist Thomas M. Holbrook concludes that his strategic campaigning in those states and others gave Truman the electoral votes he needed to win (61, 65).

The 1948 election also had an effect on pollsters, who, as Elmo Roper admitted, “couldn’t have been more wrong” (qtd. in Karabell 255). Life magazine’s editors concluded that pollsters as well as reporters and commentators were too convinced of a Dewey victory to analyze the polls seriously, especially the opinions of undecided voters (Karabell 256). Pollsters assumed that undecided voters would vote in the same proportion as decided voters—and that
turned out to be a false assumption (Karabell 258). In fact, the
lopsidedness of the polls might have led voters who supported
Truman to call themselves undecided out of an unwillingness to
associate themselves with the losing side, further skewing the polls’
results (McDonald, Glynn, Kim, and Ostman 152). Such errors led
pollsters to change their methods significantly after the 1948
election.

After the election, many political analysts, journalists, and
historians concluded that the Truman upset was in fact a victory for
the American people, who, the New Republic noted, “couldn’t be
ticketed by the polls, knew its own mind and had picked the rather
unlikely but courageous figure of Truman to carry its banner” (qtd. in
McCullough 715). How “unlikely” is unclear, however; Truman
biographer Alonzo Hamby notes that “polls of scholars consistently
rank Truman among the top eight presidents in American history”
(Man of the People 641). But despite Truman’s high standing, and
despite the fact that the whistle-stop campaign is now part of our
political landscape, politicians have increasingly imitated the style
of the Dewey campaign, with its “packaged candidate who ran so as
not to lose, who steered clear of controversy, and who made a good
show of appearing presidential” (Karabell 266). The election of 1948
shows that voters are not necessarily swayed by polls, but it may
have presaged the packaging of candidates by public relations
experts, to the detriment of public debate on the issues in future
presidential elections.
Works Cited


